Les Etats-Unis mettent au point une mini-arme atomique
Un document secret du Pentagone (lire le document ci-dessous) en t�moigne : les Etats-Unis sont en train de mettre au point une nouvelle g�n�ration d'armes nucl�aires miniatures con�ues pour l'usage dans la guerre conventionnelle. Cela signifierait �galement l'abandon des trait�s de non-prolif�ration.
Le document, qui est tomb� entre les mains du Groupe d'�tude de Los Alamos, un groupe de " sentinelles " sp�cialis�s dans les armes nucl�aires bas� aux USA, d�crit des plans pour une r�union des fonctionnaires militaires a�n�s et des scientifiques nucl�aires � la commande strat�gique des USA � Omaha, N�braska, pendant la semaine de 4 ao�t. Nous reproduisons ici ces documents qui n'ont jamais �t� publi�s.
La r�union aurait trait� du d�veloppement ult�rieur des essais pour mettre au point d'armes nucl�aires � utilisation tactique et locale. Ces armes, d'une puissance destructive de moins de cinq kilotons, ont pu �tre con�ues pour p�n�trer une soute souterraine avant explosion. La bombe d'Hiroshima l�ch�e par les USA dans 1945 a eu un rendement d'environ 15 kilotons. Ces bombes serviraient � d�truire les bunkers creus�s par les hommes de Saddam mais pourraient aussi servir contre tous ceux qui pensent que d'enterrer leurs armes pourrait les pr�server.
Les militaires des USA pensent que la mini-arme nucl�aire peut fournir une force de dissuasion susceptible de d�courager les �tats voyous. Les sp�ciaslistes am�ricains auraient d�j� tranch� pour utiliser ces mini-bombes plut�t que les armes nucl�aires standard, qui ont des rendements de centaines de kilotons et dont l'utilisation pose de graves probl�mes de gestion politique en m�me temps que des questions non r�solues de pollution.
Les fonctionnaires de gouvernement des USA ont confirm� l'authenticit� du document que nous publions, mais d�clarent qu'il couvre "la planification de gamme tr�s longue" et "n'est qu'un sc�nario envisag� parmi d'autres". Pas de quoi �tre rassur�.
Des bombes � neutrons
En outre, il y aurait �galement � l'ordre du jour pour ao�t la r�union l'utilisation de bombe � neutrosn. Celles-ci produisent une grande quantit� de rayonnement sans souffle d�vastateur et peuvent �tre employ�es pour d�cimer des r�serves et des troupes d'armes sans d�truire l'infrastructure.
Les " sentinelles " pensent que le document est extr�mement alarmant.
Patrick Garrett, un analyste de GlobalSecurity.org, a d�clar� que cela reviendrait � r�activer la guerre froide. Le fait que ces personnes s'asseoir pour parler de telles armes, de leurs essais, de leurs productions et de leurs inconv�nients signifie que l'hypoth�se de leur utilisation est s�rieusement envisag�eces personnes et que le d�ploiement de telles armes est tr�s proche. .
Garrett ajoute que les cons�quences de l'arme � neutrons ou des mini-bombes nuclaires n'est pas connu.
Menace sur les Trait�s de non-prolif�ration
Le Groupe d'�tude de Los Alamos a ajout� qu'il �tait grave d'ainsi rendre caduque les accords internationaux de non-prolif�ration. Quelle l�gitimit� auraient en effet les Etats-Unis pour donner des le�ons � Saddam, � la Cor�e du Nord s'ils sont les premiers � violer les accords. Greg Mello, dirigent des sentinelles de Los Alamos a indiqu� : " Ces trait�s de non-prolif�ration s'appliquent aux Etats-Unis aussi "
L'int�r�t r�cent des Etats-Unis pour les mini-bomes nucl�aires date de l'an 2000. Un document secret rapporte qu'en octobre 2000 que des cr�dits de la d�fense am�ricaine ont pay� une �tude de la praticabilit� de mini-armes nucl�aires et ceci en contradiction avec l'interdiction de recherche dans le domaine du d�veloppement des armes nucl�aires de champ de bataille impos�es en 1993.
En novembre 2002, le New Scientific a �galement d�voil� qu'une autre ligne budg�taire de $15 millions de dolalrs avait �t� affect� � la recherche pour mettre au point une bombe perforante nucl�ire capable de d�truire des bunkers enterr�s et d�sign�e sous le nom de code Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator.
Le document secret du Pentagone traitant de mini-bombes nucl�aires
Stockpile Stewardship Conference Planning Meeting Minutes
10 January 2003
Pentagon, Room 3C912
0930-1200
1. Mr. Fred Celec (ATSD(NCB/NM)) opened the meeting on behalf of Dr. Dale Klein (ATSD(NCB)). A list of attendees is at attachment 1.
2. Mr. Celec began by discussing the background leading to the Stockpile Stewardship Conference. The genesis of the conference is the October 2002 memo from the NWC Chairman, Mr. Pete Aldridge (USD(AT&L;)), to the NWC on risk in the stockpile stewardship program; specifically, the risk associated with not testing our nuclear weapons. Ambassador Linton Brooks (NWC member and Acting Administrator, NNSA) and General Peter Pace (NWC member and Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff) replied to the memo, expressing their support for the conference and offering comments on its expected content. The scope of the conference then evolved to include additional topics associated with the nuclear deterrent in a post-Nuclear Posture Review environment. The Stockpile Stewardship Conference will be used to present the results of the work of four panels to the NWC, and others as appropriate, and to establish recommendations for the way-ahead. Although the conference will consider issues related to nuclear testing, it is not the policy of the Administration to return to nuclear testing.
3. ACTION: The Executive Committee members agreed to revise the draft purpose statement.
Purpose: In concert with the NPR, evaluate the issues of maintaining confidence in the nuclear deterrent; evaluate the risks in our current assessment process and ways to reduce those risks, and the current and planned infrastructure capacity and capability.
4. The organization of the conference was discussed. Mr. Aldridge, the NWC Chairman, will chair the conference and Admiral Ellis (STRATCOM) will host it. The preparatory work will be performed by four panels. An Executive Committee (ExCom), chaired by Dr. Dale Klein, will provide oversight, assure that the work of the panels is in alignment throughout the process, integrate the finding of the panels, and plan the conference. To assure alignment of the panels, it was agreed that the ExCom would meet several times during the process to review the progress of the panels. It was agreed that the four panel chairs will be part of the ExCom. The members are:
ATSD(NCB) - Dr. Klein, Chairman
STRATCOM - RADM Byrd
Joint Staff - RDML Walsh
OSD (P) - Dr. Payne
NNSA - Dr. Beckner
SAG - Dr. Burnett (advisor)
SSP Strategy & Risk Panel Chair- Brig Gen Haeckel (NNSA)
Future Arsenal Panel Chair - Dr. Hardebeck (STRATCOM)
NNSA and DoD Infrastructure Chair - Mr. Beck (NNSA)
Strategy and Policy Panel Chair - Dr. Maaranen (OSD(P))
5. Mr. Celec provided some guidelines for selection of panel topics and panel members. Each of the four panels was discussed. The ExCom agreed to a draft list of topics and member organizations for each of the panels. These are at Attachment 2. The ExCom agreed that these lists are a starting point and that the panels should be free to discuss all issues they believe are relevant to their topical area. Consensus on "the answers" is not always necessary. There was some discussion regarding the value of a "common participant" to attend all panel meetings to provide consistency and help avoid duplication.
ACTION: Member organizations are requested to send the names of their organization's representatives to the panels to Ms. Stoner by January 17, 2003.
6. The ExCom agreed that the Panel Chairs are responsible for developing the Terms of Reference (TOR) for their panels. The ExCom will not have a separate TOR, but it will have an over-arching purpose statement. The Panel Chairs are expected to convene their panels to complete this work and report back to the ExCom with their TORs. It was agreed that the possibility of holding the next ExCom meeting in early February would be investigated. ACTION: The Panel Chairs are to provide the ExCom a TOR for their panel at the next meeting, likely to be held in early February 2003.
7. ACTION: The ExCom agreed to review the following topics and determine which panel is most appropriate to address them.
* What should the policy and process be for granting authority to adapt and build small quantities?
� Evaluate the DoD/NNSA Requirements process. Do we adequately identify requirements, and their priority in existing systems?
8. The ExCom agreed that the results of the conference should be reviewed by the NWC and forwarded, as appropriate, to the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Energy. There was some discussion regarding the form that the results will take. It was decided that a decision briefing to frame the issues and provide a recommendation on the way-ahead would be most useful to the Secretaries. Dr. Maarenen (OSD(P)) pointed out that if the product of the conference is an actual decision briefing on proposed DoD policy, this would require considerable coordination through OSD(P), and would significantly extend the timeline needed for a finalized conference product. The group agreed that the briefing will provide a recommended roadmap and offer suggestions on moving to further coordination.
9. Possible dates for the conference, to be held at STRATCOM, were discussed. It was agreed that the possibility of holding it the week of August 4, 2003, would be investigated.
List of Attendees
Mr. Beck, NNSA
Dr. Burnett, SAG (Advisor)
Dr. Younger, DTRA
Ms. Montie, DTRA
Dr. Hardebeck, US STRATCOM
RADM Byrd, US STRATCOM
Dr. Immele, LANL
Dr. Goldstone, LANL
Dr. McMillan, LLNL
Dr. Goodwin, LLNL
Dr. Beckner, NNSA
Brig Gen, Haeckel, NNSA
Dr. Maaranen, OSD(P)
Mr. Victory, OSD(P)
Col Blessing, JS
CAPT Sigg, US STRATCOM
Mr. Celec, OSD/AT&L; (NM)
Ms. Stoner, OSD/AT&L; (NM)
Mr. Steinhoff, OSD/AT&L; (NM) (NNSA)
Mr. Hatch, OSD/AT&L; (NM)
Dr. Wolkerstorfer, OSD/AT&L; (NM)
Mr. Wade, NNSA
Mr. Bentley, SNL/NNSA
Mr. Schoenbauer, NNSA
Col Wilmoth, OSD/AT&L; (NM)
Ms Hood, OSD/AT&L; (NM)
CAPT Manaskie, JS
Dr. Stichman, SNL
Brig Gen Smolen, AF/XON
Dr. Mullins, AF/XON
Dr. Hannah, Navy SSP
Mr. Williams, OSD(P) Consultant
Invited but did not attend:
RDML Walsh, JS
Dr. Harvey, NNSA
Dr. Payne, OSD(P)
Panels: Draft Topics Lists and Members
SSP Strategy and Risk Panel
Major Topics:
(1) How well do we quantify risk in our current assessment of nuclear weapons [warheads and those aspects of the delivery systems that impact the risk associated with the warheads] in the stockpile?
(2) What existing, and new SSP tools coming on-line could provide enhanced capabilities to quantify and minimize performance risk both for the legacy stockpile, and potential new or modified weapons?
(a) What are the anticipated limits of the extent to which improved understanding of weapon physics is basis for confidence?
(b) In consideration of new weapons that might be needed in a post-NPR environment, are the tools we have the right ones or do we need to develop new tools?
(3) Are there stockpile performance issues that we cannot now or may not in the future be able to address fully, or for which developing SSP capabilities are less certain? What are the risk mitigation measures for these existing and potential gaps in our understanding?
(4) What can we do to strengthen the process for reducing the risk in assessing the military effectiveness of our current and future stockpile?
(a) What is the overarching strategy for managing risks in the SSP?
(b) Are there alternative (foreign) approaches to managing risks that should be examined?
(5) What is the role of nuclear testing in reducing risk in the stockpile? What parts of those risks are associated with the absence of nuclear testing, in comparison to the risk associated with a 150kt threshold or a low-yield test program? What is the uncertainty in confidence and potential risk threshold for a test recommendation---what would demand a test?
(6) Assess the following with regards to the certification infrastructure:
(a) What will be the impact on (5) of the operation of the NIF over the next 5 - 15 years? Similarly, what would be the impact of the operation of AHF in 10 -15 years?
(b) What are the demands on the capabilities and capacities of the Certification Infrastructure over time?
(c) At what level, over time, can the certification (also R&D; assessment) infrastructure being develop and tested with current deliverables be transferable and agile for changing priorities?
(7) Do we need to change the rebuild strategy for QART consumed warheads?
(8) Is the current Annual Certification Process sufficient, or does it need to be modified to take into consideration political considerations regarding testing?
(9) What are the lessons we've learned since the Stockpile Stewardship Program began? In the decades when we were testing, tests sometimes revealed surprises. What have we learned from this?
SSP Strategy and Risk Panel Membership
Member Name Organization
Ron Haeckel, Chair NNSA
David Rehbein STRATCOM
Gary Betourne OSD(P)
Dave Crandall NNSA
Bruce Goodwin LLNL
Ray Juzaitis LANL
Doug Henson SNL
Susan Stoner NM
Don Wolkerstorfer NM
Frank Grand DTRA
Rod Miller AF
Mike Maglich Navy
John Birely SAG advisor
Future Arsenal Panel
Major Topics:
(1) What are the warhead characteristics and advanced concepts we will need in the post-NPR environment?
(a) Establish methodology for making choices
(b) Strategy for selecting first "small builds"
(c) Requirements for low-yield weapons, EPWs, enhanced radiation weapons, agent defeat weapons
(d) Effects modeling capabilities to effectively plan for these weapons
(e) What forms of testing will these new designs require?
(f) What obvious weaknesses exist in our ability to attack targets and assess target damage for present and future targets andweapon systems?
(2) How do we link service-provided platform requirements for the arsenal?
(a) What is the testing strategy for weapons more likely to be used in small strikes?
(b) Does a requirement for higher confidence in small strikes drive larger test asset inventories?
(c) Hardness and compatibility of conventional and dual use platforms
(i) How do we institutionalize these requirements?
(d) Leverage on existing SAGSAT efforts on dual-use platforms
(e) Reliability requirements
(f) Other requirements (e.g. precision)
(3) Given the size and composition of the operationally deployed stockpile, are our assumptions correct as we size the stockpile? (Leverage on existing US STRATCOM and NWC work.)
(a) Reliability replacements
(b) Augmentation quantities
(c) Reserve
(4) Plans for modernization of delivery platforms
(a) Are these plans consistent with the SSP and NMMP?
(b) Is the LEP schedule tuned to DoD needs?
(5) Regarding guidance requirements and assumptions on availability of GPS:
(a) Is GPS, or other advanced systems, available for all plans or just special cases?
(b) Do we put GPS on all systems, or just a few?
Future Arsenal Panel Membership
Member Name Organization
Ted Hardebeck, Chair US STRATCOM
Pat Stanton OSD(P)
NNSA
Hank O'Brien LLNL
John Immele LANL
Steve Rottler SNL
Steve Hatch NM
Tom Troyano S&TS;
George Manaskie JS
Bill Mullins AF
Barry Hannah Navy
Douglas Bruder DTRA
George Miller SAG advisor
NNSA and DoD Infrastructure Panel
[ Note from Fred Celec: As we circulated these draft minutes to ensure we fairly and accurately captured the discussion, we received several comments to the effect that the NWC has no legal responsibility for DOD infrastructure, and therefore the Infrastructure panel was misnamed and it's proposed work program too broad. Since we had discussed this issue at the meeting, I felt there was a good understanding within the group that DOD infrastructure discussions were limited to the DOD infrastructure that directly supported the SSP in general and the LEPs in particular. That said, I realized that to the outside reader or observer, the distinction between DOD and NNSA infrastructure to be examined by the panel was not that clear. We have attempted to more clearly draw that distinction in order to satisfy the more casual reader. If upon reading these minutes you feel we have failed to do so, do not hesitate to contact either myself or Susan Stoner.]
Major Topics
(1) Assess the adequacy and robustness of assessment and planned capability and capacity at and NNSA design, assessment, test, and production sites and appropriate DoD facilities. Determine if the NNSA and DoD infrastructures are agile enough to support a 'small build' strategy. [Panel should look at DoD infrastructure where it impacts NNSA's ability to do its tasking-flight testing, ranges, simulators, etc.]
(2) Examine the balance and flexibility between design, research and development, production, maintenance, and small builds.
(a) What is most stressing task?
(b) Are the required skill sets transferable and agile for changing priorities?
(c) Can we cover plausible unforeseen stockpile emergencies?
(d) What are the tradeoffs between maintenance of production capability/capacity and the supporting R&D; base?
(3) Comment on the success of implementing the Chiles Commission Recommendations and on the health, experience, and training ofdesign, engineering, and military staffs.
(4) What recommendations can be made as to how NNSA's SSP and DoD's programs can be better harmonized?
NNSA and DoD Infrastructure Panel Membership
Member Name Organization
Dave Beck, Chair NNSA
David Rehbein US STRATCOM
Pat Higgins NNSA
Glenn Mara LLNL
Don McCoy LANL
Don Cook SNL
Lew Steinhoff NM
Eric Jackson DTRA
Leonard Zentz Navy
Roberta Carlisle AF
S&TS;
Production Complex Reps
Tom Seitz SAG advisor
Strategy and Policy Panel
Major Topics
(1) The contribution of nuclear forces to each of the four principal defense goals: assurance, dissuasion, deterrence, and defeat
(2) The proper relationship of nuclear forces to the non-nuclear strike and missile defense elements of the Triad
(3) Qualitative differences in nuclear forces that may be needed to implement the strategy
(4) Policy guidance and policy issues that must be resolved to facilitate the necessary changes in nuclear forces and infrastructure
(a) Reexamine the policy issues of the various levels of testing. Should the US adjust its policy on nuclear weapons testing?
(b) How do we frame the explanation of emerging policy to show the deterrent the value of reduced-collateral damage, precision, agent defeat, and penetrating nuclear capabilities in meeting our national security objectives?
(c) What should be the policy and process for granting authorities to adapt and build small quantities?
Strategy and Policy Panel Membership
Member Name Organization
Steve Maaranen, Chair OSD(P)
Frank Dellerman OSD(P)
David Rehbein US STRATCOM
John Harvey NNSA
George Manaskie JS
Donald Minner DTRA
Dan Wilmoth NM
John Immele LANL
Michael Callahan SNL
Ron Lehman LLNL
S&TS;
Paul Robinson SAG advisor
Au Pentagone, l'utilisation du nucl�aire est d�sormais envisag�e
Le commandement am�ricain �tudie l'abaissement du seuil d'utilisation de l'arme atomique. L'Irak pourrait en �tre le premier champ d'application
(Los Angeles Times)
Les �tats-Unis envisagent l'impensable: ils se pr�parent au possible recours � l'arme nucl�aire contre l'Irak. Dans les coulisses du Commandement strat�gique am�ricain (STRATCOM), bas� � Omaha [Nebraska], comme dans les cellules de planification de l'�tat-major interarmes, on �pluche les listes d'objectifs, soup�se les options et r�vise les proc�dures, afin d'accorder aux armes nucl�aires un r�le dans la nouvelle doctrine am�ricaine de la "pr�vention". Pour l'heure, la r�flexion se concentre sur deux usages possibles des armes atomiques: pour attaquer les installations irakiennes si profond�ment enterr�es qu'elles pourraient r�sister aux explosifs conventionnels pour emp�cher l'Irak d'utiliser des armes de destruction massive. Au nom de la lutte contre le terrorisme, ces mesures bouleversent les r�gles fondamentales de l'engagement nucl�aire. Il est inqui�tant, pour au moins trois raisons, de voir les �tats-Unis abaisser le seuil d'utilisation du nucl�aire et faire ainsi dispara�tre ce qui distinguait les armes atomiques des autres.
D'abord, que Washington abaisse ainsi ce seuil, ou envisage seulement de le faire, accro�t le risque de voir d'autres pays agir de m�me. Lesquels pourraient utiliser l'arme nucl�aire dans des situations o� ils auraient en fait simplement besoin d'une force de frappe plus importante. [En fait, les �tats du "Club nucl�aire" poss�dent des armes nucl�aires tactiques (ANT) d�velopp�es pour �tre �ventuellement utilis�es au niveau du champ de bataille.] De plus, cette id�e que les armes nucl�aires ne seraient qu'une option parmi d'autres arrive � un moment o� la technologie permet d'opter pour des solutions diff�rentes, et meilleures. L'arm�e am�ricaine est de plus en plus capable de neutraliser les bases souterraines ou de d�truire les armes chimiques et biologiques sans ouvrir la bo�te
de Pandore atomique, par la combinaison d'une puissance a�rienne ultramoderne, d'op�rations sp�ciales et de capacit�s du XXI�me si�cle telles que les armes � micro-ondes de forte puissance et la cyberguerre. Enfin, on court le danger de laisser le soin d'une r�vision de la politique nucl�aire � un seul commandement militaire, le STRATCOM, qui avait jusque-l� pour mission de g�rer les questions strat�giques, et non politiques, li�es au recours � l'arme atomique. Ce commandement jouit d'une exp�rience sans �gale dans le domaine de l'emploi et des effets de ces armes, mais cette expertise ne s'�tend pas aux raisons pouvant entra�ner leur mise en �uvre.
Le ministre de la D�fense, Donald Rumsfeld, a tendance � confier les grandes refontes de doctrine politique a des organisations secr�tes �troitement contr�l�es au sein du Pentagone. Cette habitude permet de contourner toute opposition, qui, dans les forces arm�es, est souvent le fait de ceux qui ont une exp�rience approfondie de ces questions. Pour l'instant, cette
red�finition de l'emploi du nucl�aire est l'objet de travaux au quartier g�n�ral du STRATCOM, ainsi que dans de petites �quipes a Washington et dans un des "lieux tenus secrets" o� se cache le vice-pr�sident Dick Cheney [pour raisons de s�curit�], quelque part en Pennsylvanie. Le commandement, qui �tait seulement responsable des armes atomiques, a vu ses missions se multiplier. Bush vient d'approuver un m�morandum adress� par Rumsfeld demandant � ce que le commandant en chef du STRATCOM se voit accorder la charge de tout l'�ventail des options "strat�giques" dans la lutte contre les �tats et les organisations terroristes. Ce qui couvre en fait des taches tr�s diverses et regroupe ainsi sous la f�rule des sp�cialistes militaires du nucl�aire aussi bien le recours � l'arme atomique que les frappes conventionnelles, les op�rations sp�ciales et clandestines ainsi que le "camouflage strat�gique
William M. Arkin,
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